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FROM START TO FINISH: A HISTORICAL
REVIEW OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES AND STARTING OVER WITH THE
NEW START
Lisa M. Schenck* & Robert A. Youmans**
[O]n August 6, [1945,] a new weapon exploded over
Hiroshima. Its stupendous power, shattering old concepts of
war and weaponry, imposed new urgencies and demanded new
perspectives on international efforts to control armaments.
The first U.S. proposal for the control of nuclear weapons
recognized that this new force involved the interests of the
entire world community. 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

Rather than commencing with the U.S. bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear age actually began on the
morning of July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, with the
detonation of the world’s first nuclear weapon in the so-called
That test validated the design and
Trinity Explosion. 2
functionality of the plutonium implosion device, 3 nicknamed “Fat
Man” because of the round shape of the bomb casing. 4 The
Trinity Explosion produced a 21-kiloton blast, the equivalent of
exploding 21,000 tons of TNT. 5 On August 9, 1945, less than one
month after the Trinity Explosion, a Fat Man implosion bomb was
dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, killing an estimated 40,000 people. 6
This bombing, combined with the use of the “Little Boy” uranium
bomb against Hiroshima three days earlier, killed approximately
110,000 people and led to the end of World War II in the Pacific
theater. 7 The explosion over Hiroshima, 8 and the subsequent
2 HARRY A. GAILEY, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO
BAY 479 (1995).
3 See F.G. GOSLING, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: MAKING
THE ATOMIC BOMB 91-92 (2010), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/The_Man
hattan_Project_2010.pdf.
4 See id. at 83 (stating that the Fat Man was “named after Winston Churchill”).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.; see GAILEY, supra note 2, at 488, 490.
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detonation on Nagasaki, catalyzed global collective action to
address nuclear arms control. Unfathomable dimensions of
potential destruction transformed the concepts of waging war and
maintaining peace, 9 and the public understood the risks.
Over the past six and a half decades, the world has watched as
global powers negotiated arms control, grappling with this lethal
international issue. Nuclear arms control negotiations from 1925
to 2010 can be segmented into distinct periods reflecting different
approaches to the threat of nuclear arms. Six stages can be
distinguished by their evolving focused objectives:
(1) 1925–1958, concentrating on comprehensive disarmament;
(2) 1959–1968, attempting to implement partial measures to
achieve nuclear arms control;
(3) 1969–1979, holding bilateral talks (enhancing stability, as
well as maintaining world order and non-proliferation);
(4) 1980–1991, involving reassessment and repositioning by
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R. or Soviet Union); 10
(5) 1991–2009, a period of uncertainty caused by the impact of
the Soviet Union’s dissolution on the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START) and corresponding treaties; 11 and
(6) 2009–present,
encompassing
the
most
recent

In a public statement on August 6, 1945, President Truman informed the public:
That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two
thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the
largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare. . . . With this bomb we
have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to
supplement the growing power of our armed forces. . . . It is the atomic bomb.
It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe.
White House Press Release on Hiroshima, August 6, 1945: Statement by the President of the
United States, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
NUCLEAR POLICIES FROM THE DISCOVERY OF FISSION TO THE PRESENT 64-65 (Philip L.
Cantelon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
9 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 1.
10 See H.R. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & SCIENCE, 99TH CONG., FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL: PART I—NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY
IX-X (Comm. Print 1985) (prepared by the Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter
1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT] (setting forth a similar break down of time
periods, asserting that 1957 to 1968 was a comprehensive disarmament period, 1969 to
1979 reflected arms control through partial measures, and 1980 to 1984 was a period of
reassessing and repositioning by the United States and U.S.S.R.).
11 See, e.g., George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, The Arms Control Obligations of the
Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 323 (1993).
8
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developments since the expiration of the START Treaty. 12

This Article provides a historical review, describing nuclear arms
control agreements that helped diminish the nuclear arms threat
and build up.
Even as negotiations were occurring, the United States and
the Soviet Union began a nuclear arms race, with each striving to
gain a military advantage over the other by building more and
more nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. This race
led to a debate about the appropriate means to deal with the
nuclear arms problem—i.e., arms control. Essentially, collective
arms control responses from 1925 to 1991 evolved into three types
of agreements, which focused on: (1) non-armament; (2)
confidence-building measures; and (3) arms limitations. 13
After 1991, the focus became arms reduction, which initially
began as a bilateral measure, but has since become multilateral
due to the Soviet Union’s dissolution. As the United States and
Soviet Union came to realize that their vast expenditures on
nuclear weapons were not making either side safer from the other,
both parties were drawn to the negotiating table in the late 1960s
These
to discuss limits on strategic nuclear weapons. 14
negotiations resulted in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) Treaties, 15 which later led to the START Treaties—the
latest iteration of which is the New START Treaty. The relative
merits of the New START Treaty were debated at great length
during the ratification process in the United States and in the
Russian Federation. This Article describes how we arrived at this
point in the global efforts to regulate nuclear weapons, how each
approach differed and was built on previous experience, the
impact of world events on negotiations and the resultant pressure
on the parties to achieve agreement, and what we can expect in the
future of nuclear arms control.

12 The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. See Comparison of the START
Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr.
8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139901.htm.
13 These categories reflect those presented in the 1985 Congressional Nuclear Arms
Control Report. See id. at IX-XIII.
14 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES 24, 25-27 (1985).
15 See id. at 27-32.
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II. 1925–1958: COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT FOCUS
Prior to 1945 and the nuclear era, global collective agreements
regarding disarmament and arms control primarily resulted from
constraints imposed upon the defeated by victors, rather than
mutually-negotiated agreements. 16
From 1926 to 1934,
disarmament discussions (including the League of Nationssponsored multilateral general disarmament conferences) revolved
around the reduction of weapons and armed forces
(predominantly naval), and the diminution of poison gas use (such
as in World War I) and bacteriological weapons. 17 Prior to World
War II, these diplomatic efforts to reduce and limit arms
established a multilateral diplomatic structure, which included
several major powers controlling global political influence, relied
on agendas that focused on comprehensive disarmament, but
actually resulted in participants’ weaponry growing in size,
sophistication, and lethality. 18
Following the 1945 nuclear detonation in Hiroshima, arms
control and disarmament proposals included stipulations regarding
the timing of disarmament—i.e., the pace and order for
eliminating weapons—and reduction of armed forces without a
corresponding weakening of any one nation’s security. 19 The
world grappled with “[t]he inherent difficulty of promoting the
peaceful uses of the atom, without easing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, [which] ultimately led the Truman
administration to propose the Baruch [P]lan . . . .” 20
In 1946, Bernard Baruch, the U.S. representative to the U.N.
Atomic Energy Commission, presented a plan to place the world’s
atomic resources under the purview of an independent
international authority (the Baruch Plan). 21 According to the
proposal, the International Atomic Development Authority would
have exclusive control or ownership of atomic resources

See ACDA, supra note 1, at 1.
See id. at 1-2.
18 See Joseph Keith Lyou, The Social Psychology of U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
Negotiations: The Role and Experience of the U.S. Negotiator and Delegation 11-13
(June 1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Lyou Dissertation].
19 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 3.
20 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY:
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 2 (2003).
21 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 2.
16
17
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production—mining to manufacturing—and destruction. 22 The
Baruch Plan further proposed that the United States—the only
country possessing such weapons—relinquish its atomic arsenal
and secrets to the independent authority, which would inspect all
nation parties 23 willing to destroy existing bombs and stop
manufacturing weapons. 24 Essentially, the Baruch Plan called on
the United States to abandon “its nuclear weapons program after
all other states agreed to accept international control over their
nuclear programs.” 25 The Soviet Union, however, declined to
hand over its “atomic future” to a majority vote of the U.N.
Security Council 26 and opposed the staging, ownership, and
enforcement provisions of the Baruch Plan. 27
In the years following World War II, technological
advancements continued and nuclear weapons changed. Larger,
more powerful nuclear weapons were developed and mating them
to ballistic missiles provided greater range, accuracy, and throwPerhaps most alarming, the number of nations
weight. 28
possessing these fearsome weapons increased, first evidenced by
the Soviet Union’s detonation of a nuclear weapon on August 29,
1949. 29 Thus, Cold War rivals, the United States and Soviet
Union, began their infernal race to develop weapons that were
more lethal and deployed by more advanced weapon-delivery
systems. By 1953, these rivals owned and had exploded hydrogen
bombs, thus initiating the nuclear arms race.
The “deterrence” theory of arms control has its foundation in
a somewhat odd notion—i.e., treating the U.S.–U.S.S.R. nuclear
arms race as a method to maintain peace. 30 In 1954, Secretary of
See id.
Id. at 3.
24 See THE AMERICAN ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POLICIES
FROM THE DISCOVERY OF FISSION TO THE PRESENT 70 (Philip L. Cantelon et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN ATOM].
25 GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2.
26 See THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 70.
27 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 2.
28 For a discussion of the concept of throw-weight, see NOTBURGA K. CALVOGOLLER & MICHEL A. CALVO, THE SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTENT–APPLICATION–
VERIFICATION 56 (1987).
29 See MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N FOR ATOMIC ENERGY & MINISTRY OF DEF.
OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N, USSR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS: 1949 THROUGH 1990, at 11 tbl.3 (V. N. Mikhailov et al. eds., 1996), http://
npc.sarov.ru/english/issues/peaceful/peaceful_e.pdf; see also ACDA, supra note 1, at 3.
30 THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 194.
22
23
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State John Foster Dulles established the doctrine of massive
retaliation as the basis to deter war and Soviet aggression,
“whereby the United States would maintain peace by maintaining
its ability to respond to a nuclear attack or any other form of
aggression with an all-out nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union.” 31
Although nations throughout the world remained apprehensive
about possible proliferation (the expanding possession of
weapons), concern also existed regarding the testing of nuclear
weapons and the risk of radioactive debris and accidents, whether
caused by human error or miscalculation, mechanical failure or
malfunction, or an unauthorized or misinterpreted action. 32
From 1956 to 1962, the United States (through the Atoms for
Peace program) supplied peaceful nuclear technology—such as
research reactors, training, and fissionable material—to twenty-six
developing and friendly nations. 33 In return, the recipient nations
fulfilled U.S.-required safeguards, such as having inspectors
continually monitor the transferred technology to ensure its
peaceful use. 34 Nevertheless, until 1959, negotiations primarily
focused on comprehensive disarmament, with the United Nations’
global leadership and Presidents Truman (1945–1952) and
Eisenhower (1953–1960) at the helm for the United States.
However, negotiations did not result in any formal international
arms control agreements during the period 1945–1958. 35
III. 1959–1968: PARTIAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS ARMS CONTROL
From the late 1950s to 1960s, global arms control negotiations
shifted their focus from the generalized commitment to
comprehensive disarmament (i.e., disarming the world) to the
more focused approach of deterrence (i.e., preventing use of
nuclear weapons). With the development of intercontinental
Id. at 193.
See ACDA, supra note 1, at 88.
33 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2.
34 Id.
35 See Lyou Dissertation, supra note 18, at 14. Lyou discusses the various events that
stalled negotiations:
The Berlin Blockade, the Czechoslovakian coup, the Truman Doctrine, the
first Soviet atomic weapons test, the communist takeover in China, the Korean
War, the development of the hydrogen bomb, McCarthyism, and the
successful launching of Sputnik I all contributed to, and were the result of,
heightened post-war contentiousness between the nascent superpowers.
Id. at 14-15.
31
32
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ballistic missiles in the late 1950s came reduced delivery time for
strategic weapons (from hours to minutes), and a modified U.S.
political position from deterrence of war to avoidance of Soviet
aggression. 36
By 1964, the arms race between the United States and Soviet
Union reached a point at which curtailment became necessary.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, France, and People’s Republic
of China had already tested nuclear weapons, and dozens of others
nations had the potential capability to develop these lethal
weapons. 37 The need for accountability for nuclear materials
production, and the possibility of illegal stockpiles or concealed
weapons-manufacturing sites, highlighted the benefits of flexibility
and practicality in negotiations. 38 Consequently, attempts at
negotiating limited or partial measures became the primary focus
of negotiations. This focus was predicated on an underlying hope
that gradual progress toward complete disarmament could be
accomplished by limiting the scope of agreements (thereby
dividing the nuclear arms threat into “pieces”). 39
From this point on, arms control negotiations progressed in
three areas. A 1985 Congressional Report, The Fundamentals of
Nuclear Arms Control, astutely categorized nuclear arms control
agreements into three categories: (1) non-armament agreements,
which limit militarization from certain areas; (2) confidencebuilding measures, which reduce the risk of war; and (3) armslimitation agreements, which constrain development, testing, and
deployment of nuclear weapons technologies. 40
A. Non-Armament Agreements
During the period from 1959 to 1968, multilateral negotiations
resulted in several non-armament agreements. In 1959, for
example, the multilateral Antarctic Treaty established a nonarmament agreement which demilitarized the Antarctic, rendering
the area off-limits for any but peaceful purposes. Such nonarmament treaties were “designed to keep free of conflict and
See THE AMERICAN ATOM, supra note 24, at 194.
GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2.
38 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 3-4.
39 See id.
40 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at IX-X. The authors
have adopted these categories from the 1985 Congressional Nuclear Arms Control Report
for use in this Article.
36
37
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nuclear weaponry the environments that science ha[d] made newly
accessible and significant, and whose resources must be preserved
for all—for example, outer space or the seabed—or geographic
regions where nuclear weapons ha[d] not been introduced—
Antarctica and Latin America.” 41 The Antarctic Treaty was
followed by the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967
(prohibiting the introduction, use, and threat of use of nuclear
weapons in Latin America), the Outer Space Treaty of 1967
(prohibiting the presence and use of weapons of mass destruction
in outer space and limiting the moon to peaceful uses), and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 (maintaining the
Each of these
non-nuclear-weapon status of nations). 42
agreements focused on keeping certain areas free of armaments.
The parties to them attempted to restrict the expansion of nuclear
arms to certain geographical areas, and thereby fulfilled a subissue within the overall threat of nuclear arms and the generalized
goal of complete disarmament.
The Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967 (also
known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was the first of the nuclearweapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaties. 43 Such agreements were
designed:
[T]o enhance international regulation of nuclear arms by
establishing geographical regions wherein the testing,
possession, and stationing of nuclear weapons are
prohibited. . . . [to] reduce the likelihood that states in th[at]

ACDA, supra note 1, at 4.
1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at X. The NPT “called for
non-nuclear-weapon states to forgo development of nuclear weapons and to expose their
nuclear power facilities to international safeguards and inspections.” Id. Although parties
to the NPT included many nations:
The continued absence of two nuclear weapons states (the [People’s Republic
of China] and France), the one previously nonnuclear power to subsequently
conduct a known nuclear test (India), and a number of potential nuclear
powers (including Libya, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa,
Argentina, and Brazil) from the group of nations committed to the treaty . . .
limit[ed] its effectiveness.
Id. In 1977, the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (U.S.–IAEA
Safeguards Agreement), a follow-on to the NPT, described the process of selecting U.S.
facilities in which to apply the full regime of IAEA safeguards procedures, including
routine inspections. See ACDA, supra note 1, at 163.
43 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 3-4, 41. The Latin American NWFZ
treaty was followed by the South Pacific NWFZ treaty in 1985, Southeast Asia in 1995,
and Africa in 1996. See id. at 41.
41
42

SCHENCK & YOUMANS_Article (Do Not Delete)

408

CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW

4/24/2012 2:39 PM

[Vol. 20:399

region[] will be compelled to seek nuclear weapons in response
to a neighbor, thereby decreasing their probability of becoming
involved in a nuclear war. 44

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. has called the NWFZ treaty
process “a regional security idea to limit the risk that others near
you may obtain nuclear arms” 45 and “the back-door route toward
the elimination of nuclear weapons.” 46
On July 1, 1968, the United States signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). 47 The NPT represented the first
major effort by the international community of nations to limit the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Article VII of the
treaty, for example, authorized states to establish NWFZs in their
territories. 48 By the early 1960s, there were five declared nuclear
powers—the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union,
China, and France—and growing international concern that this
number could increase. 49 The NPT, which entered into force on
March 5, 1970, recorded the “bargain” 50 between the declared
nuclear states and the non-nuclear states: the declared nuclear
states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear
states, 51 while at the same time working towards the goal of
eventual nuclear disarmament; 52 the non-nuclear states agreed not
to acquire nuclear weapons 53 and to accept full-scope safeguards
Id. at 41.
Interview with Thomas Graham, Jr., Ambassador to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), in Bethesda, Md. (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Graham Interview]
(Ambassador Graham’s professional history also includes: Legal Advisor to the U.S.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Delegation (1974–79), Senior Arms Control
Agency Representative to the U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Delegation (1981–
82), Legal Advisor to the U.S. Nuclear and Space Arms Delegation (1985–88), and the
Senior Arms Control Agency Representative and Legal Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Negotiation (1989–90), and
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the NPT Review Conference (1980)).
46 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2002).
47 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].
48 See id. art. VII.
49 See William Epstein, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Review Conferences: 1965
to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 855-62
(Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993).
50 See Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/npt/index.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
51 See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 47, art. I.
52 See id. art. VI.
53 See id. art. II.
44
45
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on all their peaceful nuclear activities and facilities. 54 While the
number of nuclear weapon states—both declared and
undeclared—has increased since 1970, the NPT remains the
cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread
of nuclear weapons and, with over 180 parties, it is the most widely
adhered-to arms control agreement in history. 55
In the NPT itself, the parties further restrained nuclear arms
expansion by prohibiting countries from spreading nuclear
weapons technology. The parties negotiated the NPT due to U.S.
and Soviet concerns regarding China’s nuclear weapons testing. 56
Non-weapons states saw nuclear weapon capability as the
“ultimate indicia of respect” as a “powerful” or “big” world
power. 57 To achieve a consensus, weapon states had to entice the
non-weapon states with a balanced commitment that would
eliminate the political attractiveness of possession of the weapons
themselves. 58 Article VI of the NPT was that key provision,
requiring the leading “proliferation concern”—i.e., the United
States—to ultimately relinquish its nuclear arms program. 59
Although the five nuclear weapons states promised in Article VI
to negotiate to end the arms race, reduce nuclear armaments, and
eliminate the nuclear arsenals, 60 this was not the crucial bargaining
provision. The overall objective to eliminate the nuclear program
of the key arms leader, the United States, was more important and
there has been consistent support for this goal with each
Presidential Administration. 61
With this multilateral agreement, non-nuclear weapon states
See id. art. III.
See LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMM’N,
ARTICLE IV OF THE NPT: BACKGROUND, PROBLEMS, SOME PROSPECTS (2004),
available at http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No5.pdf.
56 Interview with Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Board Member, Dep’t of Def. Policy Bd., in
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Blechman Interview] (former Assistant
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1977), Deputy Chairman of
the U.S. Delegation for Negotiations on Arms Transfers, and Member of the Commission
to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld Commission 1998)).
57 Graham Interview, supra note 45; GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 327.
58 Graham Interview, supra note 45.
59 Blechman Interview, supra note 56.
60 GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 2.
61 Blechman Interview, supra note 56. This provision has been the subject of some
controversy. For example, even though the United States has not conducted nuclear arms
testing since 1992, and by 2012 will have reduced its arsenal by 80%, some contend that
the United States has not fulfilled its obligation to eliminate the nuclear weapons program.
Id.
54
55
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agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons, 62 while nuclear weapon
states agreed “to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology
and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate
elimination of nuclear weapons.” 63 Parties used these nonarmament agreements to limit expansion of the nuclear arms
threat and associated risks. The NWFZ treaties provided area
security for nations, while the NPT provided overall assurance that
nuclear weapon states would not pass on their capabilities. 64
B. Confidence-Building Measures
The Cuban Missile Crisis 65 in October 1962 highlighted the
“imminence of nuclear war” among superpower leaders and
“stimulated a new willingness to explore bilateral approaches to
tension reduction and crisis management.” 66 Additionally, the
world watched and wondered about the potential risk of nuclear
war, whether caused by accident, misunderstanding, or intentional
acts of aggression. In response to the public and political
prominence of this life-threatening issue, two international

See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 47, art. II.
GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 327.
64 After the international community had addressed the threat posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons with the NPT, the related threat posed by the
proliferation of missiles and missile technology was also recognized. As a result, the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987. See MTCR, http://
www.mtcr.info/english/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). The MTCR is a non-legally
binding political arrangement among nations that are suppliers of missile technology who
share the common goal of preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.
Id. Its current membership is 34 nations. Id. The Regime consists of a common export
policy, set forth in the MTCR Guidelines, which is applied to a common list of controlled
items, set forth in the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex, that represents virtually
all of the equipment and technology that would be needed for missile development,
production and operation. Id. Each member nation pledges to implement export controls
on these items in accordance with their national legislation. Id. The United States has
done so by means of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799 (2006). Under
the MTCR Guidelines, all missile and missile technology exports are to be subjected to a
“case-by-case” review and all Category I exports—complete missile systems and major
components thereof—are to be subjected to a “strong presumption” of denial. MTCR
Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, MTCR, http://www.mtcr
.info/english/guidelines.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
65 The Cuban Missile Crisis entailed thirteen days following the United States’
discovery of the Soviet Union’s strategic offensive missiles positioned in Cuba, and
involved the U.S. naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba launched in response,
which resulted in the Soviet withdrawal of missiles. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE
OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1-2 (1971).
66 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at X.
62
63
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agreements were established: the Hot Line Agreement and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. 67
The confidence-building agreement known as the “Hot Line”
Agreement of 1963 (the Memorandum of Understanding Between
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link) 68
established an emergency link between the two superpowers. This
first bilateral agreement limited the risk of war by establishing a
direct, rapid, and reliable emergency communications link
between the Soviet Union and the United States for use during a
“military crisis which might appear directly to threaten the security
of either of the states involved and where such developments were
taking place at a rate which appeared to preclude the use of
normal consultative procedures.” 69
In addition to stimulating the United States and Soviet Union
to establish bilateral, confidence-building agreements, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, a watershed event, also generated arms-limitations
measures. This international crisis yielded increased public
knowledge about and intensified global attention to the nature and
effects of radioactive fallout and the potential for cumulative
environmental contamination and resultant genetic damage. 70
C. Arms-Limitation Agreements
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis changed the arms-control
negotiating context. This decisive event added a sense of urgency
and provided a more vivid perception of the risks and capabilities
involved. Public recognition of and concern regarding the threat
of nuclear arms led to support for an international collective
agreement.
In the mid-1950s, fallout from U.S. and Soviet testing
incidents caused radioactive debris to fall on a Japanese fishing
67 See Hot Line Agreement: Narrative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/4785.htm#narrative (last visited Feb. 2, 2012); Limited Test Ban Treaty: Narrative, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm#narrative (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
68 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct
Communications Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 472 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hot
Line Agreement].
69 ACDA, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting U.S., Working Paper on the Reduction of the
Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communication (Dec. 12,
1962) (submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee)).
70 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 24.
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vessel in the South Pacific (U.S. test) and Japan proper
experienced “rain containing radioactive debris” (Soviet test). 71
As a result, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
China, and France began negotiating an agreement to end nuclear
testing and established the arms-limitation measure known as the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 (Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water). 72 Since then, a total of 116 parties have signed on to this
treaty. 73
The parties initially disagreed as to compliance verification
provisions, including the system of controls and inspection. 74 This
disagreement was motivated by concern about “clandestine
violation[s],” due to a lack of verification capability or adequate
seismic detectors to identify underground testing. 75 The United
States demanded “onsite inspection to detect covert testing,
especially underground,” while the Soviets resisted onsite
inspections. 76 After high-level, three-power talks with the United
States, Soviet Union, and France, 77 President Kennedy suggested
removing underground testing from the scope of the agreement
and the parties overcame the stalemate over verification. 78
Consequently, the LTBT prohibits nuclear testing or any
other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, outer space, and under
water, or anywhere else if it would result in “radioactive debris . . .
outside the borders of the state conducting the explosion.” 79
According to Acting Secretary of State Ball, “[t]he phrase ‘any
other nuclear explosion’ includ[ed] explosions for peaceful

See id. at 29.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
73 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 31.
74 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 25.
75 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 29-30. The issue regarding detection of
underground testing also delayed achieving consensus during the multilateral
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiation, but the parties gained confidence in
verification capabilities with improved technology of seismic detectors. Blechman
Interview, supra note 56. The parties ultimately achieved consensus and signed the CTBT
in 1996. History of the CTBT: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www
.state.gov/t/avc/rls/159263.htm.
76 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XI.
77 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 30 (“In 1960, France conducted its first
nuclear test in the Sahara Desert . . . .”).
78 See id. at 30.
79 ACDA, supra note 1, at 27.
71
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purposes.’” 80 The latter distinction attempted to avoid “the
difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and
peaceful explosions without additional controls.” 81
IV. 1969–1979: BILATERAL APPROACH BEGINS
A. Non-Armament Agreements
Following the LTBT in 1963, some global fear faded, risks
became less obvious, civil defense drills stopped in the United
States, and other international concerns rose to the forefront of
the global agenda when nuclear weapons testing went
Nevertheless, scientific advancements in
underground. 82
oceanographic technology, interest in the ocean floor as a
resource, concern about potential disputes due to the absence of
established rules of law, and fear that aggressive parties could use
this new environment for military installations or nuclear weapons
launching sites, led to the Seabed Treaty of 1971. 83
Similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, Outer Space Treaty of
1967, and NWFZ treaties, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof (Seabed Treaty) 84 is a non-armament treaty. The parties
faced difficulties in defining territorial waters, but ultimately
agreed to a twelve-mile limit, corresponding with the definition of
territorial sea in the Convention on the Territorial Sea. 85
Prior to establishing an agreement, the parties also engaged in
extensive, intense discussions regarding verification provisions. 86
The Soviets proposed verification measures similar to the Outer
Space Treaty—with all installations and structures open to
inspection when reciprocal rights are granted—but the United
States opposed such a provision because the seabed, unlike the
80 Id. at 27 (quoting Acting Secretary of State Ball’s report to President Kennedy)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. (quoting Acting Secretary of State Ball’s report to President Kennedy) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
82 Graham Interview, supra note 45; Blechman Interview, supra note 56.
83 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 80.
84 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
85 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 284.
86 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 80.
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moon, is fraught with national jurisdiction claims of the area. 87
The parties finally agreed to verification provisions which allowed
the parties to use their own verification means, other parties’
assistance, or international procedures. Thus, parties were given
the ability to fulfill obligations without interfering with other,
legitimate, seabed activities. 88
B. Confidence-Building Measures
Between 1969 and 1979, the superpowers also established
three bilateral confidence-building agreements: the Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Accidents Measures Agreement) (1971); 89 the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-USSR
Direct Communications Link (“Hot Line” Modernization
Agreement) (1971); 90 and, the Prevention of Nuclear War
Agreement (1973). 91
The two superpowers designed these
agreements to build trust and confidence in each other.
With the Accident Measures Agreement (AMA) and the Hot
Line Modernization Agreement, the parties attempted to reduce
risks associated with nuclear arms. By signing the AMA, the
parties committed to: maintain and improve organizational and
technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized nuclear
weapons use; immediately notify the other country of any
accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident involving
possible nuclear weapon detonation which might cause a risk of
nuclear war; and, to provide advanced notice of any planned
missile launches beyond territorial limits in the other party’s
direction. 92
See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 284.
See id.
89 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 30,
1971, 807 U.N.T.S. 57.
90 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, Sept.
30, 1971, 806 U.N.T.S. 402. Technological advancements in satellite communications since
the 1963 Hot Line prompted the Hot Line Modernization Agreement, which established
operation, equipment, and cost allocations to form two satellite communications circuits
between the United States and the Soviet Union. See ACDA, supra note 1, at 91.
91 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, 24 U.N.T.S. 1478.
92 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 88.
87
88
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In 1973, the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement again
instituted procedures to ensure international cooperation and
reduce the risk of nuclear war. The Prevention Agreement, a
bilateral agreement between the two superpowers, set forth a code
of conduct, such as refraining from the threat or use of force
toward the opposing signatory and toward third party countries to
avoid nuclear war. The agreement thereby had multilateral
implications and imposed a commitment to consult in the event of
nuclear confrontation. 93
C. Arms-Limitation Agreements
Despite the “narrow avoidance of worldwide thermonuclear
destruction” during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the
resultant bilateral confidence-building agreements and armslimitations measures described above, the arms race between the
two superpowers “spurred on.” 94 In response, between 1969 and
1972, the United States and Soviet Union convened the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) to address “this phenomenon
of an all-out, uncontrolled, dangerous nuclear arms race.” 95
By the late 1950s, both nations had developed and flight
tested ballistic missiles with range and payload capabilities
sufficient to deliver a nuclear weapon from each nation to the
territory of the other. 96 These “intercontinental ballistic missiles”
(ICBM) represented the mating of mankind’s most fearsome
weapon, the nuclear weapon, to the most advanced weapon
delivery system yet devised, the ICBM. 97 Each nuclear-armed
missile was a weapon system of awesome destructive power. Yet,
as both the United States and the Soviet Union embarked on
massive ICBM-production programs in the early 1960s, neither
side felt significantly safer, due to the massive arsenal being built
by their opponent. Thus, each felt compelled to build and deploy
more and more missiles. By the late 1960s, each nation had over
See id. at 128.
GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 36.
95 Id.
96 See Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear U.S. and
Soviet/Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 1959–2008, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 62, 64-66, available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/65/1/62.full
.pdf+html.
97 See John B. Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, in JOHN NORTON
MOORE ET. AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 551-60 (1990) (discussing the concept of the
ICBM in greater detail).
93
94
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one thousand nuclear-armed ICBMs aimed at the other. 98
The escalating nuclear arms race was a source of growing
concern to senior U.S. officials, as was the mounting evidence of
Soviet construction of rudimentary anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems around Leningrad and Moscow. 99 Because of concern that
an ABM race between these two nations could be strategically
destabilizing, as well as concern over the mounting cost of the ongoing arms race, the two nations agreed to engage in offensive and
defensive arms limitation talks. 100 The result was the SALT talks
which began in November 1969, 101 lasted three years, and
produced three agreements: the Interim Agreement, the ABM
Treaty, and SALT II.
The bilateral SALT I negotiations were focused on limiting
strategic offensive and defensive weapons delivery vehicles. 102
SALT I resulted in two finalized agreements: (1) the Interim
Agreement on Offensive Arms I (Interim Agreement) (1972); 103
and (2) the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) (1972). 104
The Interim Agreement restrained the rivalry between the United
States and Soviet Union by limiting offensive strategic weaponry
on land and submarine-based offensive nuclear weapons. 105 The
ABM Treaty limited ABM defensive systems (designed to
intercept strategic ballistic missiles). 106
The Interim Agreement was to remain in force for five years.

98 Id. at 63. See also Fen Osler Hampson, SALT I: Interim Agreement and ABM
Treaty, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 65, 71
(Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds., 1987).
99 See Norris & Kristensen, supra note 96, at 66.
100 See id. at 68. See also CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 28, at 15-16.
101 See Hampson, supra note 98, at 71. See also CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note
28, at 11-13.
102 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 36; GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 306.
103 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter Interim
Agreement].
104 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
105 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 110-11.
106 The ABM Treaty allows each party to have one ABM site to protect its capital city
and another to protect its ICBM field, “limits ABM launchers, missiles, and radars, and
restricts certain kinds of testing.” 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note
10, at 19-20. The 1974 ABM Treaty Protocol further reduced the number of ABM
deployment areas to one site only. See also ACDA, supra note 1, at 131.
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It “essentially [froze]” the number of strategic ballistic missile
launchers (operational and under construction) and allowed an
increase in sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers “up to
an agreed level, for each party only with the dismantling or
destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM
While “modernization and replacement of
launchers.” 107
[strategic] missiles were permitted . . . . launchers for light or older
ICBMs could not be converted into launchers for modern heavy
The general terms, however, did not alleviate
ICBMs.” 108
uncertainty regarding the amount of weapons in the Soviet
arsenal. 109 This agreement was intended to be a “freeze”—a
temporary, stop-gap measure to hold strategic offensive arms at
existing levels110 to give arms-control negotiators additional time
to address the enormously difficult challenges associated with
trying to produce a comprehensive nuclear arms limitation
agreement. 111
When they came to the negotiating table, the parties did not
have symmetrical weapon systems or strategic forces, and their
defense needs and requirements were materially different—i.e.,
the United States was obligated to defend overseas allies, while the
Soviets had nearby allies. 112 Furthermore, “U.S. and Soviet
offensive strategic forces differed [significantly from each other
because of] . . . . historical, geographic,” and other reasons. 113
Since the United States had a “strong tradition of air and naval
power,” the United States had advantages in heavy bombers and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). 114 Since the Soviet
Union had “a large land mass, it concentrated on the development
and deployment of land-based strategic ballistic missiles. 115 The
result was two strategic-force structures that were difficult to
compare for arms limitation purposes. In addition,
The Soviet Union [initially] sought to define as “strategic” any
107 ACDA, supra note 1, at 121. See also Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. III;
1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.
108 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 29. See also Interim Agreement, supra
note 103, arts. IV, II.
109 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 43.
110 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 7-8.
111 See id. at 29.
112 See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 20, at 308.
113 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 27.
114 Id. at 28.
115 Id.
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U.S. or Soviet weapon system capable of reaching the territory
of the other side. This would have included U.S. forward-based
systems, chiefly medium-range bombers based in Europe . . .
[that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union] . . . [but]
would have excluded Soviet intermediate-range [ballistic]
missiles . . . aimed at Western Europe and . . . [incapable of]
reach[ing] the United States. 116

The Interim Agreement was also significant because it
formalized the principle of non-interference with national
technical means of verification. 117 A number of issues relating to
the U.S.–Soviet strategic equation were, for a variety of reasons,
not addressed by the Interim Agreement—such as strategic
bombers, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). 118 An
additional complication was the military commitments made to
other nations and alliances—the United States to NATO, and the
Soviet Union to the Warsaw Pact. The parties decided, however,
to leave these issues for subsequent arms control negotiations. 119
The Interim Agreement entered into force on October 3, 1972 and
expired on October 2, 1977.
The ABM Treaty was probably the most significant, and
certainly the longest-lasting, of the SALT agreements. While the
offensive part of the strategic equation would take almost twenty
years (until START was signed in 1991) to solve, the defensive part
was solved via negotiation in a mere three years (1969–1972). The
ABM Treaty, which was signed and entered into force in 1972,
limited the development, testing, and deployment of anti-ballistic
missile, or ABM, systems—i.e., systems designed to counter or,
“shoot down,” strategic ballistic missiles. 120 The Treaty imposed
limits on the number of ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars
that both sides could deploy. 121 It limited where those components
could be deployed to each nation’s capital and at one ICBM field
of each Party’s choosing. 122 The ABM Treaty also banned the
Id.
See Interim Agreement, supra note 103, art. V.
118 See CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 28, at 29-39.
119 Rhinelander, supra note 97, at 603-10.
120 Id. at 588-95.
121 See ABM Treaty, supra note 104, art. III.
122 See id. A 1974 Protocol to the Treaty reduced these two choices to one and called
upon the Parties to pick which site they would defend. Protocol to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
116
117
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development, testing, or deployment of “sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based” ABM systems or
components, 123 thus expressing a clear preference for fixed and
land-based ABM systems or components.
Such limitations
supported the Treaty’s verification regime, which, like the Interim
Agreement, also reflected the principle of non-interference with
national technical means of verification. 124 The ABM Treaty was
unlimited in duration, 125 subject to review every five years. 126 Both
sides had the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six months’
notice. 127 The United States exercised its withdrawal right on
December 13, 2001. 128 This decision, which became effective on
June 13, 2002, removed a significant impediment to the
development, testing, and deployment of U.S. missile defense
programs.
In Article VII of the Interim Agreement of SALT I, the
parties agreed to continue active negotiations regarding strategic
offensive arms. The SALT II negotiations began in 1972, guided
by the goal of replacing the Interim Agreement “with a long-term
comprehensive [t]reaty providing broad limits on strategic
offensive weapons systems.” 129 The SALT II Treaty 130 represented
a move beyond the arms “freeze” created by the Interim
Agreement to a permanent treaty that would provide meaningful
reductions in strategic offensive arms. SALT II limited the total
number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles held by each party to
2,400 (and reduced to 2,250 after January 1, 1951). 131 Within this
aggregate ceiling, the parties agreed to limit launchers of ICBMs
and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, air-to-surface ballistic missile
Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., arts. I-II, July 3, 1974, 27
U.S.T. 1647. The Soviet Union decided to defend Moscow while the United States chose
to defend the ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota. See ACDA, supra note 1, at
131.
123 ABM Treaty, supra note 104, art. V.
124 Id. art. XII.
125 Id. art. XV.
126 Id. art. XIV.
127 See id. art. XV, ¶ 2.
128 See ABM Treaty: U.S. Withdrawal Notice, ACQWEB (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.acq
.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/ABMwithdrawal.htm.
129 ACDA, supra note 1, at 189.
130 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 96-1 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1138 [hereinafter SALT II].
131 Id. art. III, ¶¶ 1-2.
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equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for longrange cruise missiles to no more than 1,320. 132 Additional
limitations included: maximum throw-weights and launch-weights
of light and heavy ICBMs; a limit on the testing and deployment of
one “new type” of ICBM; limits on the number of reentry vehicles
on certain ICBMs and SLBMs; a ban on the testing and
deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater
than 600 kilometers; a ban on the construction of new ICBM
launchers; a ban on heavy, mobile ICBMs and heavy SLBMs; and
agreements on data exchanges and advance notification of certain
ICBM test launches. 133
U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet Chairman Leonid
Brezhnev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) in Vienna, Austria, on June
18, 1979. The submission of SALT II to the U.S. Senate for
ratification during the summer of 1979 resulted in a very
contentious series of ratification hearings and substantial Senate
opposition. 134 Prospects for Senate ratification were doomed
when, in December 1979, Soviet military forces invaded
Afghanistan. 135
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter
asked the Senate to suspend consideration of SALT II. 136 On July
25, 1980, President Carter signed Presidential Directive 59, 137
which described the U.S. nuclear-war-fighting policy, including
plans for conducting a limited nuclear war. 138 The United States
remained a signatory to SALT II and continued to abide by its
numerical limits on strategic nuclear launch vehicles until late
Id. art. V, ¶ 1.
See Dan Caldwell, From SALT to START: Limiting Strategic Nuclear Weapons, in 2
ENCYLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 895-907 (Richard Dean Burns
ed., 1993). See also Stephen J. Flanagan, SALT II, in SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL:
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 105-34 (Albert Carnesale & Richard N. Haass eds.,
1987); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 32-35.
134 See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 903-07.
135 Id. See also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 14, at 19-20.
136 See 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 29.
137 For the text of this directive, see Presidential Directive/NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy, JIMMY CARTER LIBR. & MUSEUM (July 25, 1980), http://www.jimmy
carterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf.
138 See L. Hagen, Comments on Presidential Directive 59, 1980, in THE AMERICAN
ATOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POLICIES FROM THE DISCOVERY OF
FISSION TO THE PRESENT 210-11 (Philip L. Cantelon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
132
133
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1986. 139 Despite SALT II’s failure to enter into force, the Treaty
represented pioneering concepts that were carried over into the
subsequent START Treaty, such as the “existing type” concept as
a means of determining accountability of the treaty over certain
systems, focusing on launchers as a way of limiting ballistic
missiles, and the formulation of warhead attribution rules designed
to track the military capability of each covered system and to limit
the testing activities that could be undertaken with each covered
system. 140
President Reagan, a 1979 member of the Committee on the
Present Danger (an anti-SALT, anti-arms control, anti-Soviet,
non-profit, private organization) and opponent of SALT in 1980, 141
succeeded Carter and called for the modernization of nuclear
defenses. 142 Although he chose not to revive SALT II, President
Reagan ensured that the United States did not deploy troops
exceeding SALT II limits, as long as the Soviets did so, as well. 143
The Soviet Union also agreed to adhere to SALT II’s terms, and
the un-ratified agreement continued to guide national policy for
both parties. 144
The Nuclear Freeze Movement arose in response to the
Senate’s failure to ratify SALT II and Presidential Directive 59.
The faction’s goals included urging the superpowers to freeze
nuclear-weapons testing and production, missile deployment, and
the development of new aircraft delivery systems. 145 The Freeze
Movement gained substantial public support in the early 1980s,
which led the Democratic Party to adopt the Freeze positions as
part of its campaign platform in 1984. 146
See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 907.
See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
art. III, ¶¶ 9, 6, 4, July 31, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter START
I].
141 See KENNETH L. ADELMAN, THE GREAT UNIVERSAL EMBRACE: ARMS
SUMMITRY—A SKEPTIC’S ACCOUNT 251 (1989).
142 See 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XIII.
143 See id. at 29; ACDA, supra note 1, at 190.
144 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 190.
145 See DAVID ADAMS, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS 15 (electronic ed. 2002)
(1985), available at http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6-15.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2012); Blechman Interview, supra note 56.
146 See Lawrence S. Wittner, What Activists Can Learn from the Nuclear Freeze
Movement, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 18, 2003, 1:38 PM), http://hnn.us/articles/1636
.html.
139
140
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Other arms-limitation agreements during this period—both of
which were bilateral—included the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT) (1974), 147 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)
Treaty (1976). 148 President Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate
scandal caused the TTBT to be “hastily thrown together in a
month in Moscow at [Secretary of State] Kissinger’s urging, to give
Nixon something to sign at the 1974 Summit,” one month before
Nixon’s resignation. 149 Consequently, the TTBT did not address
peaceful nuclear explosions, considered “a pie in the sky.” 150 The
PNE followed after two more years of negotiations, delayed
mainly because the Soviets initially held fast to the idea of using
nuclear explosions to dig a major canal. 151
These companion agreements filled the void remaining after
the LTBT, which only addressed above-ground testing limits.
Together, the TTBT and PNE “extended the limited test ban to
underground tests—whether of weapons or ‘peaceful’ devices—of
more than 150 kilotons.” 152 The TTBT prohibited underground
tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons (approximately 150,000
tons of TNT), and thus set forth “a nuclear threshold,’” 153 limiting
the explosive force of any new nuclear warheads and bombs. 154
The PNE provided the same restrictions on peaceful underground
nuclear explosions for civilian development projects. 155
147 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July
3, 1974, S. TREATY DOC. No. 101-19 (1990) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1990) [hereinafter
Threshold Test Ban Treaty].
148 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May
28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 891, 1714 U.N.T.S. 432 [hereinafter Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Treaty].
149 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 61.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at XII.
153 ACDA, supra note 1, at 133.
154 See Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 147, art. I, ¶ 1.
155 See Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, supra note 148, art. III, ¶ 2; 1985 NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 22. The subsequent protocol to the PNE
Treaty “provided for limited onsite inspection under very specific circumstances.” Id.
Although not directly related to nuclear arms control, two other agreements were signed
during the period from 1969 to 1979. Pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), opened for
signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, a multilateral agreement signed in 1972, parties
agreed to stop “develop[ing], produc[ing], stockpil[ing], or acquir[ing] biological agents or
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The TTBT and PNE served to limit the expanding weapons
technology by restricting or ‘capping’ the explosive force of the
weapons. As they had done before, the parties used agreement to
restrain the threat of nuclear arms and arms capabilities. Thus, by
limiting weapons capabilities, the parties were able to stem the
growth of the nuclear arms threat. 156
V. 1980–1991: REPOSITIONING
A. Confidence-Building Measures
Several confidence-building measures (some multilateral,
others bilateral), designed to reduce the risk of war, were
established from 1980 to 1991.
In 1980, the multilateral Nuclear Material Convention 157: (1)
provided minimum physical-protection levels for the international
transport of nuclear material; (2) set forth “a general framework
for cooperation among states in the protection, recovery, and
return of stolen nuclear material”; and (3) listed certain offenses
for which offenders would be subject to extradition or
prosecution. 158
In 1984, the bilateral Hot Line Expansion Agreement 159
upgraded the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Hot Line, increasing communications
equipment speed and adding facsimile and graphic material

toxins ‘of types [and qualities] . . . no[t] justifi[ed] for prophylactic, protective, and other
peaceful purposes,’ as well as weapons and means of delivery.” ACDA, supra note 1, at
96. In 1977, under the multilateral Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Environmental
Modification Convention), opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108
U.N.T.S. 151, parties agreed not to use climate modification techniques for military or
hostile purposes even if such techniques became feasible in the future. See ACDA, supra
note 1, at 153.
156 Kenneth Adelman, U.N. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (1983–87) for President Reagan, asserts otherwise, stating that
“halting nuclear testing would actually increase the number of nuclear weapons and make
future nuclear arms less safe . . . . No one advocates stopping the testing of ships or guns or
planes—indeed, we would never purchase a car that had not been fully tested . . . .”
ADELMAN, supra note 141, at 31.
157 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456
U.N.T.S. 125.
158 ACDA, supra note 1, at 218.
159 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to Expand the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, July 17, 1984,
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/hotexpa.htm.
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transmission capability. 160
With the 1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement, 161
the United States and the Soviet Union established centers
connected by facsimile to supplement communications between
the nations. The Agreement also provided the capacity for
government-to-government notifications, communications, and
information exchanges required by other arms control and
confidence-building agreements. 162
In 1986, further measures were established “to increase
openness and predictability about military activities in Europe,
with the aim of reducing the risk of armed conflict” there. 163 State
members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, including the United States, Soviet Union, France, and
United Kingdom, drafted the Document of the Stockholm
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the
Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid
Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. 164 The Document established notification, observation,
forecasting, and onsite inspection procedures for military activities
(exceeding a certain number of troops) in Europe. 165
In 1988, the superpowers agreed to another confidencebuilding measure, the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement. 166 This bilateral treaty attempted to limit the risk of
nuclear war, due to “misinterpretation, miscalculation, or
accident,” by requiring parties to provide advance notification
prior to launching intercontinental ballistic missiles and

See ACDA, supra note 1, at 228.
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Sept.
15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 76.
162 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 246.
163 Id. at 231.
164 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant
Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1987).
165 See ACDA, supra note 1, at 232.
166 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 31, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1200.
160
161
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submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 167
B. Arms-Limitation Agreements
The Reagan Administration reformulated the existing
negotiations scheme into the 1982–1991 Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) (1987), which were designed “to limit the actual
weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill people,’ as
distinguished from the . . . approach of the Nixon, Ford, Carter
administrations, which only limited the delivery vehicles—missiles
and bombers.” 168 SALT I & II:
[H]ad used launchers (i.e., ICBM silos, SLBM tubes, and
bombers) as the object of . . . limitation . . . to a certain degree
because of monitoring capabilities. However, the advent of
deploying multiple warheads on missiles . . . had reduced the
relevance of this measure. To the Reagan administration, it
was essential to address the weapons themselves, especially the
highly accurate ICBM warheads. 169

The first years of these negotiations achieved little progress,
in part because of the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range
nuclear forces in Europe. 170 This weapons installation not only
represented a major distraction from the task of limiting strategic
arms, but also had a chilling effect on U.S.–Soviet relations. 171 The
pace and progress of strategic arms negotiations between these
two nations gained traction in the mid-1980s. 172 In 1983, President
Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, which called
for development of a missile defense system that would render
nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” 173 In 1985, President
Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev met for the first time at the
Geneva Summit, and established a personal relationship that
would prove enormously important later on. 174 Significantly, they
ACDA, supra note 1, at 347.
GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 58. Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. asserts that the
Reagan approach is the same as the Interim Agreement and SALT II because “warheads
are counted on the basis of their association with missiles and the missiles on the basis of
their association with launchers . . . .” Id.
169 1985 NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL REPORT, supra note 10, at 31.
170 See Caldwell, supra note 133, at 908.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 908-09.
173 Id. at 908.
174 See id. at 909.
167
168
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“agreed that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought.’” 175 Additionally, they affirmed their mutual goals of
working towards an INF accord and limiting strategic offensive
arms. 176
Reagan and Gorbachev met again in October 1986 at the
Reykjavik Summit for what would be a meeting characterized by
“dramatic and far-reaching [arms control] proposals.” 177 By the
end of the meeting, the two sides had agreed on an outline for a
START Treaty contemplating reductions in strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles to 1,600 and a ceiling on deployed nuclear
warheads of 6,000. 178 “[T]he Reykjavik Summit was the true
watershed of modern arms control” 179 when the Soviet Union
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Reagan
became “negotiators-in-chief,” 180 agreeing “to equal global ceilings
of systems capable of carrying 100 INF missile warheads, none of
which would be deployed in Europe. . . . [and the Soviets]
proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments . . . .” 181
The INF was a success story that evolved from the Reykjavik
Summit because Gorbachev agreed in principle to the INF’s
intrusive on-site inspection provisions. 182
In 1987, the parties signed the INF arms-limitation agreement.
In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had decided to forward-deploy
the SS-20 missile—an intermediate-range missile with three
nuclear warheads capable of striking the capitals of Western
Europe. 183 The resulting international tensions, which were
complicated by a growing European peace movement, moved
NATO to call for a “‘dual track’ strategy” 184 to deal with this
threat: arms control negotiations between the United States and
Soviet Union, combined with the deployment of U.S. Pershing II
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, both of which were
Id.
See id.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 909-10.
179 GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 124.
180 ADELMAN, supra note 141, at 63.
181 ACDA, supra note 1, at 253.
182 See GRAHAM, supra note 46, at 125.
183 See Janne E. Nolan, The INF Treaty: Eliminating Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Missiles, 1987 to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT 955-64 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993).
184 ACDA, supra note 1, at 252.
175
176
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nuclear-armed. 185
The arms control negotiations began in
December 1981 and had to overcome numerous obstacles,
disagreements, and one Soviet walk-out. 186 Nonetheless, they
eventually led to agreement on what was referred to as the
“double-zero” option: the complete elimination of all
intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles. 187 The
resultant INF Treaty 188 required each party to destroy its 500- and
5,500-kilometer ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, as
well as associated launchers, support structures, and equipment. 189
Within a three-year elimination period—commencing on June 1,
1988, the date the Treaty entered into force—the two sides
eliminated all Pershing II and SS-20 missiles and other systems
covered by the Treaty. 190
The INF Treaty was ground-breaking in the history of arms
control negotiations between the nuclear superpowers because it
gave both sides their first experience with on-site inspection—a
verification technique that was almost unthinkable at the time in
the Cold War. Other firsts attributed to the INF Treaty were
establishment of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the
capitals of both sides and the routine exchange of launch
notifications—accomplished through those Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers—for missile launches permitted by the INF
Treaty under limited circumstances, for research and development
purposes. 191 Its most significant accomplishment, however, was
eliminating an entire class of weapons—intermediate-range
nuclear missiles.
VI. 1991–2009: START IN FORCE
In December 1987, Gorbachev came to Washington to sign
the INF Treaty and the parties announced an agreement on the
START framework. The two sides would still need several years
to resolve the remaining issues, most notably the implications
See Nolan, supra note 183.
See id.
187 See id.
188 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-11 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
189 ACDA, supra note 1, at 252.
190 See id. at 252.
191 INF Treaty, supra note 188, art. VII, ¶ 12, art. XIII, ¶ 2.
185
186
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posed by the new U.S. effort on missile defense. 192 U.S. President
George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev finally signed
the START Treaty (START I) on July 31, 1991. 193
START I obligated the superpowers to notify each other of
any ICBM or SLBM flight test, including those into the upper
The Treaty also allowed for the
atmosphere or space. 194
deployment of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with 6,000
accountable warheads. 195 Of these, only 4,900 could be deployed
on missiles, and of these 4,900 warheads, only 1,100 could be
deployed on mobile ICBMs. 196 The reductions called for by
START I were to be carried out in three phases over seven years
so that the final 1,600/6,000 numbers were arrived at seven years
after entry into force. 197 Pursuant to START I, the parties
adopted a verification regime similar to that contained in the INF
Treaty regarding data exchanges, on-site inspection, launch
notifications, and respect for national technical means of
verification. 198 A major difference was START I’s rules on
telemetry encryption, not present in the INF Treaty, which were
designed to prevent both sides from developing and testing new
strategic missiles without notifying the other side. 199
Compared to the very limited achievements of the Interim
Agreement and the SALT II, START I was a major success. It
was the first arms control agreement between the United States
and Soviet Union that required the elimination of almost 50% of
the deployed warheads both sides possessed. START I was
limited in duration to 15 years, with a provision allowing the
parties to extend the Treaty for successive 5-year periods. 200 While
many may have expected that this option would be exercised, that
never occurred.
Less than a month after START I had been signed, a group of
hard-line Soviet Government officials tried to overthrow the
government of President Gorbachev. 201 Although unsuccessful,
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
See START I, supra note 140.
See ACDA, supra note 1, at 347.
START I, supra note 140, art. II.
Id.
Id.
Id. arts. VIII-XII.
Id. art. X.
Id. art. XVII.
Caldwell, supra note 133, at 911.
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this attempted coup showed how tumultuous the Soviet
Government was behind the scenes and the fragility of President
Gorbachev’s hold on power. This culminated in an unexpected
development that greatly complicated the entry into force of the
START Treaty: the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This
surprising event, which occurred in December 1991, raised
significant questions about the status, and even the viability, of
START I.
The May 1992 Lisbon Protocol 202 addressed these questions
when four nations—Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the
Russian Federation—agreed to assume the former Soviet Union’s
START Treaty obligations. 203 START I was still viable but
became a multilateral, rather than bilateral, treaty. In addition,
Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan pledged to remove all nuclear
weapons from their soil and return them to the Russian
Federation. 204 These three nations subsequently joined the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. 205
Despite the clarity the Lisbon Protocol provided, the START
Treaty did not enter into force until December 5, 1994. This delay
occurred largely due to the time required for the three nations to
complete the process of joining the NPT. 206 As a result, START
I’s seven-year reduction period, as well as the Treaty’s fifteen-year
duration, began on that date. In addition to the strategic arms
limitation and reduction efforts taking place within the Treaty’s
mechanisms, further arms control efforts were taking place outside
of the START Treaty.
Soon after START was signed, President George H.W. Bush
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a follow-on treaty,
known as START II, on January 3, 1993. 207 START II was
intended to build on the strategic arms reductions achieved

202 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 23, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-32 (1992) [hereinafter Lisbon
Protocol].
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 The Lisbon Protocol at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.armscontrol
.org/node/3289 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
207 Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.Russ., Jan. 3, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter START II].
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pursuant to START I by moving toward greater reductions. 208
Total deployed warheads were to be reduced from 6,000 under
START I to around 3,500. 209 Also, ICBMs with MIRVed
warheads were banned, although SLBMs with MIRVs were
permitted. 210 START II did not enter into force, however, because
the Russian Duma’s ratification of START II was made
conditional on the U.S. Senate approving certain agreements that
the United States and Russian Federation had negotiated to
update the ABM Treaty. 211 This approval never occurred because
of strong opposition in the Senate to the ABM Treaty. 212
Accordingly, on June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty had become effective, the Russian
Federation announced their withdrawal from START II. 213
The Russian Federation’s decision to withdraw from START
II had little practical consequence because of the Treaty of
Moscow (also known as SORT). 214 This Treaty—signed by
President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin on May
24, 2002—called for reductions in strategic offensive weapons far
beyond those described in START II: total deployed nuclear
warheads were to be reduced to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by
December 31, 2012. 215 The parties agreed that all the other
provisions of the 1991 START Treaty would remain in effect,
including the verification regime. 216 This two-page Treaty filled
the void left by the demise of START II and carried the
SALT/START process forward to the New START Treaty, 217
which was designed to take the place of the then-expired START
208 See id. pmbl. (“Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in
doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and
limitations provided for in the START Treaty . . . .”).
209 Id. art. I.
210 Id. art. II.
211 See U.S.–Russian Treaties & Agreements, NTI, http://216.109.75.135/f_wmd411/
f1b2_2.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-8
(2002) [hereinafter SORT].
215 Id. art. I.
216 Id. art. II.
217 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, art. XIV,
¶ 4, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-5 (2010) [hereinafter New START
Treaty].
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Treaty and supersede the Treaty of Moscow upon its entry into
force. 218
In addition to the START I and II Treaty negotiations taking
place, on May 31, 2003, President George W. Bush unveiled the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led, “global effort
that aims to stop [the] trafficking of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from
states and non-state actors [that are] of proliferation concern.” 219
Its legal status is as a non-legally-binding political arrangement
among like-minded nations seeking to prevent WMD proliferation
through proactive means, including interdiction. 220 When a nation
endorses the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, they commit
to: (1) “interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal
authorities;” (2) “develop procedures to facilitate exchange of
information with other countries;” (3) “strengthen national legal
authorities to facilitate interdiction; and” (4) “take specific actions
in support of interdiction efforts.” 221
More than 90 nations have joined the PSI’s voluntary, nontreaty-based regime. 222 This commitment reflects the international
community’s desire to prevent “WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials” from falling into the hands of nations of concern
or terrorists. 223 In effect, the PSI calls upon the international
community to use already-available legal tools to enforce their
shared non-proliferation goals. 224
218 The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. See supra note 12. See also New
START Treaty, supra note 217, art. XIV, ¶ 4.
219 Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/
c10390.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Another international regime that emerged during this time intended to promote
global peace and security was the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC), adopted in November 2002. See Hague Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/trty/101466.htm (last updated Oct. 2011) [hereinafter HCOC]. Its goal is to bolster
efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide through commitments, such as
providing pre-launch notifications of missile launches, and through transparency
measures, such as annual declarations on ballistic missile launches during the preceding
year. Id. The HCOC was envisioned as a supplement to the MTCR without the more
stringent membership process found in the MTCR. See supra note 64, for a discussion of
the MTCR. HCOC membership is unrestricted and is currently over 125 nations. See
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VII. 2009–PRESENT: START EXPIRES AND THE NEW START
TREATY ARRIVES
The START Treaty expired by its own terms at midnight
December 4, 2009. 225 The United States and Russian Federation
had previously announced their desire to conclude a follow-on
treaty to replace START, but the negotiations were not concluded
until after START had expired. 226 On April 8, 2010, Presidents
Obama and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, signaling a
new chapter in the SALT/START process.
The New START Treaty consists of the basic Treaty text, the
Protocol containing additional rights and obligations, and a series
of Technical Annexes. 227 This new Treaty reduces deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles to 700 within seven years after it enters into force. 228 This
is nearly 75% lower than the START Treaty warhead level and
30% lower than the level the Treaty of Moscow prescribed. 229
Within that Treaty limit, each Party has the ability to determine its
own force structure. 230 Similar to the START Treaty’s verification
regime, New START includes provisions for on-site inspections,
exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications, as well as exchanges
of telemetry. 231 In certain respects, the verification regime is not as
extensive as was the verification regime under START. For
example, the exchanges of telemetry between the Parties will be
on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per year. 232
This reflects, among other things, the existence of a new
HCOC, supra.
225 U.S.–Russian Treaties & Agreements, supra note 211.
226 See Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement by the Delegations of the
Russian Federation and the U.S. on New Start Treaty (May 13, 2010), http://www.state
.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141827.htm. See also Gallery: Negotiating New START, DEF.
TREATY INSPECTION READINESS PROGRAM, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/NC/gallery/newstart
.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
227 See Press Release, White House, Key Facts About the New START Treaty (Mar.
26, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-newstart-treaty.
228 New START Treaty, supra note 217, art. II.
229 See Press Release, White House, supra note 227.
230 Id.
231 See New START Treaty, supra note 217, arts. XI, VII, IX.
232 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, U.S.-Russ., pt. 7, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/140047.pdf.
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relationship between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate approved a
Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty by a vote of
71 to 26. 233 The ratification hearings were very contentious,
reflecting concerns over Russian treaty compliance, missile
defense, and nuclear stockpiles. 234 Those concerns were discussed
in the Resolution of Ratification, which includes provisions calling
for a Presidential certification that U.S. national technical means
of verification are sufficient to warn of any Russian preparation to
“break out” of the limits of the Treaty and a Presidential
certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the
Treaty. 235 The Russian Duma approved ratification of the New
START on January 25, 2011, and the formal instruments of
ratification were exchanged on February 5, 2011, at which time the
New START Treaty entered into force, for a duration of ten
years. 236
VIII. BACK TO THE FUTURE: WHERE WILL WE GO WITH
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?
If the New START Treaty should expire after its ten-year
duration has run its course, what will happen next? While it is
difficult to predict the future of the SALT/START process, there
are some predictable paths that might be chosen. For example, the
process could take a more multilateral approach to nuclear arms
control. A ‘Post-New START Treaty’ could seek to include
additional parties, perhaps beginning with the United Kingdom
and France, and possibly including the People’s Republic of China,
India, and Pakistan—Israel and North Korea would likely not be
interested.
Alternatively, a more expansive approach to nuclear arms
control could occur. Critics of the New START point out the
Treaty’s failure to address tactical nuclear weapons. 237 The
156 CONG. REC. S10982 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 5185224.
See, e.g., Senate Votes on New START Treaty, McCain and DeMint Lead Opposition
by Gregory Hilton, DC WORLD AFF. BLOG (Sept. 15, 2010), http://diplomatdc.word
press.com/2010/09/15/senate-votes-on-new-start-treaty-on-thursday-mccain-and-demintlead-opposition-by-gregory-hilton.
235 156 CONG. REC. S10982-83 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 518224 at **3.
236 New START Treaty, supra note 217, art. XIV.
237 See Ariel Cohen, The New START Ratification: Russia Tactical Nuke Advantage
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Senate’s Resolution of Ratification required a Presidential
certification that the United States would initiate negotiations with
the Russian Federation regarding an agreement to limit tactical
nuclear weapons. 238 A future Post-New START Treaty could also
address limits on non-deployed nuclear warheads—warheads that
START and New START left unconstrained. This was likely
done because, in a nuclear exchange, there would not be sufficient
time to retrieve warheads from their storage facilities and mount
them on ICBMs in time to launch them at the enemy. As warhead
levels drop, the warheads kept in storage could become more
significant in the military equation, depending on where they were
stored and how difficult it would be (with advances in missile
technology) to install them on missiles.
The future could also bring continued reductions in deployed
nuclear weapons. But just how low can the United States and
Russian Federation go? The United States won World War II in
the Pacific with two nuclear weapons. 239 But, the NPT establishes
an international goal of “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date” followed by “general and complete disarmament.” 240
This suggests that additional reductions remain possible.
The SALT/START process has not been without flaws, or
without critics. As the United States and Russian Federation
move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, one can
question whether mature nations such as these continue to need an
arms control treaty to guide their actions. One could also question
the extent to which the SALT and START Treaties contributed to
keeping the peace between the nuclear superpowers over the past
forty years. Clearly other factors were at work—e.g., the military
might of both sides, skilled and diligent diplomacy, each side’s
growing economic interests in the other, and the fact that both
sides were rational adversaries of one another. Nevertheless, if the
SALT and START Treaties made even the slightest contribution
to preventing a nuclear war, then that may be reason enough for
this process to continue.
Arms control negotiations have moved from focusing on

Should Caution the Senate, FOUNDRY BLOG (Dec. 1, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://blog.heritage
.org/2010/12/01/the-new-start-ratification-russia-tactical-nuke-advantage-should-cautionthe-senate.
238 156 CONG. REC. S10982 (daily ed. Dec, 22, 2010), 2010 WL 5185224.
239 See GAILEY, supra note 2.
240 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 47, art. VI.
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comprehensive disarmament (1925–1958), to attempts at
implementing partial measures (1959–1968), to bilateral talks
(1969–1979), to reassessment and repositioning by the United
States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1980–1991), to the
present situation—the United States working with the Russian
Federation to achieve strategic arms reductions (1991–present).
Essentially, nuclear arms control negotiations continue to be an
activity for the superpowers. Perhaps, limiting the response to this
global problem to the superpowers, rather than attempting global
collective action, is the way of the future. In any case, the key
players continue to be responsible for crafting a response, albeit
among only themselves.
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